Introduction
Over the last decade econometric inference based on simulation techniques has become increasingly common, particularly for latent variable models. The reason is that such models often generate econometric objective functions that embed high-order integrals, and which, consequently, can be most easily evaluated using simulation techniques.
1 There are several well known classical techniques for inference by simulation. Perhaps most common are the Method of Simulated Moments (McFadden (1989) ) and Simulated Maximum Likelihood or SML (Lerman and Manski, (1981) ). In practice, both methods require that reasonably accurate simulators be used to evaluate the integrals that enter the objective function (see Geweke, et. al., (1994) ). Bayesian techniques are also becoming quite popular. These techniques typically entail Markov Chain -Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation to evaluate the integrals that define the posterior densities of a model's parameters (see Geweke and Keane (1999b) for an overview of MCMC methods).
Our goal in this chapter is to explain concretely how to implement simulation methods in a very general class of models that are extremely useful in applied work: dynamic discrete choice models where one has available a panel of multinomial choice histories and partially observed payoffs. Many general surveys of simulation methods are now available (see Geweke (1996) , Monfort, et. al., (1995) , and Gilks, et. al., (1996) ), so in our view a detailed illustration of how to implement such methods in a specific case has greater marginal value than an additional broad survey. Moreover, the techniques we describe are directly applicable to a general class of models that includes static discrete choice models, the Heckman (1976) selection model, and all of the Heckman (1981) models (such as static and dynamic Bernoulli models, Markov models, and renewal processes.) The particular procedure that we describe derives from a suggestion by Geweke and Keane (1999a) , and has the advantages that it does not require the econometrician to solve the agents' dynamic optimization problem, or to make strong assumptions about the way individuals form expectations.
This chapter focuses on Bayesian inference for dynamic multinomial choice models via the MCMC method. Originally, we also hoped to discuss classical estimation of such models, so that readers could compare the two approaches. But, when we attempted to estimate the model developed below using SML it proved infeasible.
The high dimension of the parameter vector caused iterative search for the maximum of the simulated likelihood function via standard gradient based methods to fail rather dismally. In fact, unless the initial parameter values were set very close to the true values, the search algorithm would quickly stall. In contrast, the MCMC procedure was computationally feasible and robust to initial conditions. We concluded that Bayesian inference via MCMC has an important advantage over SML for high dimensional problems because it does not require search for the optimum of the likelihood. and Wolpin (1989) for a description of many alternative structural models that fit into this framework.
The econometrician is interested in drawing inferences about , θ the vector of structural parameters. One econometric procedure to accomplish this (see Rust (1987) or Wolpin (1984) ) requires using dynamic programming to solve system (1.1)-(1.3) at many trial parameter vectors. At each parameter vector, the solution to the system is used as input to evaluate a prespecified econometric objective function. The parameter space is systematically searched until a vector that "optimizes" the objective function is found. A potential drawback of this procedure is that, in general, solving system (1.1)-(1.3) with dynamic programming is extremely computationally burdensome.
The reason is that the mathematical expectations that appear on the right-hand side of (1.1) are often impossible to compute analytically, and very time-consuming to approximate well numerically. Hence, as a practical matter, this estimation procedure is useful only under very special circumstances (for instance, when there is a small number of state-variables.) Consequently, a literature has arisen that suggests alternative approaches to inference in dynamic multinomial choice models.
Some recently developed techniques for estimation of the system (1.1) -(1.3) focus on circumventing the need for dynamic programming. Several good surveys of this literature already exist, and we will not attempt one here (see Rust (1994) ). Instead, we simply note that the idea underlying the more well-known of these approaches, i.e., Hotz and Miller (1993) and Manski (1993) , is to use choice and payoff data to draw inferences about the values of the expectations on the right-hand side of (1.1). A key limitation of these procedures is that, in order to learn about expectations, each requires the data to satisfy a strict form of stationarity in order to rule out cohort effects.
The technique proposed by Geweke and Keane (1999a) for structural inference in dynamic multinomial choice models also circumvents the need for dynamic programming. A unique advantage of their method is that it does not require the econometrician to make strong assumptions about the way people form expectations.
Moreover, their procedure is not hampered by strong data requirements. It can be implemented when the data includes only partially observed payoffs from a single cohort of agents observed over only part of their life cycle.
To develop the Geweke-Keane approach, it is useful to express the value function (1.1) as: A finite order polynomial will in general provide only an approximation to the true future component.
Hence, it is important to investigate the extent to which misspecification of the future component may affect inference for the model's structural parameters. Below we report the outcome of some Monte Carlo experiments that shed light on this issue. The experiments are conducted under both correctly and incorrectly specified future components. We find that the Geweke-Keane approach performs extremely well when ( ) H F ⋅ is correctly specified, and still very well under a misspecified future component. In particular, we find that assuming the future component is a polynomial when it is actually generated by rational expectations leads to only "second order" difficulties in two senses. First, it has a small effect on inferences with regard to the structural parameters of the payoff functions. 3 Second, the decision rules inferred from the data in the misspecified model are very close to the optimal rule in the sense that agents using the suboptimal rule incur 'small' lifetime payoff losses.
2 Restrictions of this type can be tested easily by estimating versions of the model with different but nested future components. 3 These findings are related to those of Lancaster (1996) , who considered Bayesian inference in the stationary job search model. He found that if the future component is treated as a free parameter (rather than being set "optimally" as dictated by the offer wage function, offer arrival rate, unemployment benefit and discount rate) there is little loss of information about the structural parameters of the offer wage functions. (As in our example, however, identification of the discount factor is lost.) The stationary job search model considered by Lancaster (1996) has the feature that the future component is a constant (i.e. it is not a function of state variables). Our procedure of treating the future component as a polynomial in state variables can be viewed as extending Lancaster's approach to a much more general class of models.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two describes the application, and section three details the Gibbs sampling algorithm. Section four reviews our experimental design and results, and section five concludes.
The Dynamic Multinomial Choice Model
In this section we present an example of Bayesian inference for dynamic discrete choice models using the GewekeKeane method of replacing the future component of the value function with a flexible polynomial function. The discussion is based on a model that is very similar to ones analyzed by Wolpin (1994, 1997 ).
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We will set , ( 1,..., 4).
The nonpecuniary payoffs ( ) 1,4 ijt j v = are assumed serially independent.
The state of the agent at the time of each decision is
The laws of motion for experience in the occupational alternatives and school are:
.
The number of 'home' choices is excluded from the statespace as it is linearly dependent on the level of education, the period, and experience in the two occupations.
It is convenient to have notation for the elements of the state vector whose value in period t+1 depends nontrivially on their value in period t or on the current choice. The reason, as we note below, is that these elements are the natural arguments of the future component. We define
The value of each alternative is the sum of its current period payoff, the stochastic non-pecuniary payoff and the future component:
The function F represents agents' forecasts about the effects of their current state and choice on their future payoff stream. The function is fixed across alternatives, implying that forecasts vary across alternatives only because different choices lead to different future states, and it depends only on the choice and the state variables in
Since choices depend only on relative alternative values, rather than their levels, we define for {1, 2, 3} j ∈ :
. 
The first term in (3.1) is the so-called "complete data" likelihood function. It is the likelihood function that could be formed in the hypothetical case that we had data on N individuals observed over 40 periods each, and we observed all of the value function differences Z and the complete set of wages W for all alternatives. This is:
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The second term in (3.1) is the joint prior distribution. We assume flat priors on all parameters except the two precision matrices, for which we assume the standard noninformative priors (see Zellner, (1971), section 8.1):
The Gibbs sampler draws from a density that is proportional to the product of (3.2) and the two densities in (3.3).
The Gibbs sampling algorithm is used to form numerical approximations of the parameters' marginal posterior distributions. It is not feasible to construct these marginal posteriors analytically, since doing so requires high dimensional integrations over unobserved wages and value function differences. Implementing the Gibbs sampling algorithm requires us to factor the joint posterior defined by (3.1)-(3.3) into a set of conditional posterior densities, in such a way that each can be drawn from easily. Then, we cycle through these conditionals, drawing a block of parameters from each in turn. As the number of cycles grows large, the parameter draws so obtained converge in distribution to their respective marginal posteriors, given certain mild regularity conditions (see Tierney (1994) for a discussion of these conditions). An important condition is that the posterior distribution be finitely integrable, which we verify for this model in Appendix B. Given the posterior distribution of the parameters, conditional on the data, the investigator can draw exact finite sample inferences.
Our Gibbs sampling-data augmentation algorithm consists of six steps or 'blocks.' These steps, which we now briefly describe, are cycled through repeatedly until convergence is achieved.
Step 1. Draw value function differences { } , 1, ; 1,3; 1, 40
Step 2. Draw unobserved wages { }
Step 3. Draw the log-wage equation coefficients .
Step 4. Draw the log-wage equation error-covariance matrix . ε Σ
Step 5. Draw the parameters of the future component π and school payoff parameters . α
Step 6. Draw the nonpecuniary payoff covariance matrix .
Step 1: We chose to draw the { } max 0, ( ) .
Case 2: ijt Z is not associated with the chosen alternative, and 'home' was not chosen. Thus, we draw .
it ijt id t Z Z < Case 3: 'Home' was chosen. In this case, we draw 0.
ijt Z <
We draw from the appropriate univariate, truncated Gaussian distributions using standard inverse CDF methods.
Step 2: We chose to draw the unobserved wages { } 
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This distribution is nonstandard as wages enter in both logs and levels. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to sample from this distribution using rejection methods (see Geweke (1995) for a discussion of efficient rejection sampling).
In brief, we first drew a candidate wage c w from the distribution implied by the first exponential of (3.4), so that (1,1)(1 ( (1, 2) /( (1,1) (2, 2)). w Otherwise, the process is repeated until a draw is accepted.
Step 3: Given all wages, value function differences, and other parameters, the density of 1 2 ( , ) β β is:
So that 1 2 ( , ) β β is distributed according to a multivariate normal. In particular, it is easy to show that 
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It is straightforward to draw β from this multivariate normal density.
Step 4: With everything else known 1 ε − Σ has a Wishart distribution. Specifically, it is immediate from the joint posterior that
It is easy to draw from the Wishart and then invert the 2 X 2 matrix to obtain .
ε Σ
Step 5: It is convenient to draw both the future component π parameters and the parameters α of the school payoff jointly. Since the future component for school contains an intercept, it and the constant in Λ cannot be separately π has a multivariate normal density given by:
where .
NT I
η Ω = Σ ⊗ We draw from this using a standard, multivariate normal random number generator.
Step 
Experimental Design and Results
This section details the design and results of a Monte Carlo experiment that we conducted to shed light on the performance of the Gibbs sampling algorithm discussed in section two. We generated data according to equations (2.1) -(2.7), using the true parameter values that are listed in column two of Table 3 . The table does not list the discount rate and the intercepts in the school and home payoff functions, which were set to 0.95, 11000 and 17000 respectively, since these are not identified. In all of our experiments we set the number of people, N, to 2000.
Data from this model were generated using two different assumptions about the way people formed expectations. First, we assumed that people had rational expectations. This required us to solve the resulting dynamic optimization problem once to generate the optimal decision rules. Since the choice set includes only four discrete alternatives it is feasible to do this. Then, to simulate choice and wage paths requires only that we generate realizations of the appropriate stochastic variables. It is important to note that the polynomial future component used in the estimation procedure does not provide a perfect fit to the rational expectations future component. Hence, analysis of this data sheds light on the effect that misspecification of the future component may have on inference.
Next, we assumed that agents used a future component that was actually a polynomial in the state variables to form decisions. Analysis of this data set sheds light on how the algorithm performs when the model is correctly specified. To ensure close comparability with the rational expectations case, we constructed this polynomial by regressing the rational expectations future components on a fourth-order polynomial in the state-variables, constructed as described in the discussion preceding (2.8). We used the point estimates from this regression as the coefficients of our polynomial future component (see Appendix A for the specific form of the polynomial).
We found that a fourth order polynomial provided a good approximation to the future component in the sense that if agents used the approximate instead of optimal decision rule they suffered rather small lifetime earnings losses. Evidence of this is given in Table 1 , where we report the results of simulations under optimal and suboptimal decision rules. The simulations were conducted as follows. First, for N=2000 people we drew five sets of lifetime (T=40) realizations of the model's stochastic components { }
i t i t ijt j ε ε η = In Table 1 these are referred to as error sets one to five. For each of the five error sets we simulated lifetime choice histories for each of the 2000 people under the optimal and approximate decision rules. We refer to the 10 data sets constructed in this way as 1-EMAX through 5-EMAX and 1-POLY through 5-POLY, respectively. We then calculated the mean of the present value of lifetime payoffs (pecuniary plus nonpecuniary) for each of the 2000 people under the optimal and approximate decision rules, respectively, for each of the five error sets. These are reported in the second and third rows of Table 1 . Holding the error set fixed, the source of any difference in the mean present value of lifetime payoffs lies in the use of different decision rules. The mean present values of dollar equivalent losses from using the suboptimal polynomial rules are small, ranging from 287 to 491. The percentage loss ranges from 8 hundredths of one percent to 14 hundredths of one percent. These findings are similar to those reported by Geweke and Keane (1999a) and Krusell and Smith (1995) . Table 2 reports the mean accepted wages and choice frequencies for the data generated from error-set two.
The first set of columns report statistics for data generated according to the polynomial approximation (data set 2-POLY) while the second set of columns report results from the optimal decision rule (data set 2-EMAX). Under our parameterization, occupation one can be thought of "unskilled" labor, while occupation two can be understood as "skilled" labor. The reason is the mean of the wage offer distribution is lower in occupation two early in life, but it rises more quickly with experience. The choice patterns and mean accepted wages are similar under the two decision rules. School is chosen somewhat more often under the optimal decision rule, which helps to generate slightly higher lifetime earnings. Finally, note that selection effects leave the mean accepted wage in occupation two higher than that in occupation one throughout the life-cycle under both decision rules.
Next, we ran the Gibbs algorithm described in section two for 40,000 cycles on each data set. We achieved about three cycles per minute on a Sun ultra-2 workstation. 5 Thus, while time requirements were substantial, they 5 To begin the Gibbs algorithm we needed an initial guess for the model's parameters (although the asymptotic behavior of the Gibbs sampler as the number of cycles grows large is independent of starting values). We chose to set the log-wage equation 's β equal to the value from an OLS regression on observed wages. The diagonal elements of ε Σ were set to the variance of observed log-wages, while the off-diagonal elements were set to zero.
The school payoff parameters were all initialized at zero. All of the future component's π values were also started at zero, with the exception of the alternative-specific intercepts. The intercepts for alternatives one, two and three were minor compared to what estimation of such a model using a full solution of the dynamic programming problem would entail. Visual inspection of graphs of the draw sequences, as well as application of the split sequence diagnostic suggested by Gelman (1996) -which compares variability of the draws across subsequences-suggests that the algorithm converged for all ten artificial data sets. In all cases, the final 15,000 draws from each run were used to simulate the parameters' marginal posterior distributions. Table 3 reports the results of the Gibbs sampling algorithm when applied to the data generated with a polynomial future component. In this case, the econometric model is correctly specified. The first column of Table   3 is the parameter label, the second column is the true value, and the remaining columns report the structural parameters' posterior means and standard deviations for each of the five data sets. 6 The results are extremely encouraging. Across all runs, there was only one instance in which the posterior mean of a parameter for the first wage equation was more than two posterior standard deviations away from its true value: the intercept in data set one. In data sets four and five, all of the structural parameters' posterior means are within two posterior standard deviations of their true values. In the second data set, only the second wage equation's own experience term is slightly more than two posterior standard deviations from its true value. In the third data set the mean of the wage equation's error correlation is slightly more than two posterior standard deviations from the true value, as are a few of the second wage equation's parameters.
Careful examination of Table 3 reveals that the standard deviation of the nonpecuniary payoff was the most difficult parameter to pin down. In particular, the first two moments of the marginal posteriors of these parameters vary considerably across experiments, in relation to the variability of the other structural parameters' marginal posteriors. This result reflects earlier findings reported by Geweke and Keane (1999a) . In the earlier work they found that relatively large changes in the value of the nonpecuniary component's standard deviation had only a small effect on choices. It appears that this is the case in the current experiment as well.
It is interesting to note that an OLS regression of accepted (observed) log-wages on the log-wage equation's regressors yields point estimates that differ sharply from the results of the Gibbs sampling algorithm. Table 4 contains point estimates and standard errors from such an accepted wage regression. Selection bias is apparent in the estimates of the log-wage equation's parameters in all data sets. This highlights that the Bayesian simulation algorithm is doing an impressive job of implementing the appropriate dynamic selection correction.
Perhaps more interesting is the performance of the algorithm when taken to data that was generated using optimal decision rules. Table 5 reports the results of this analysis on data sets 1-EMAX to 5-EMAX. Again, the were initialized at -5,000, 10,000, and 20,000, respectively. These values were chosen with an eye towards matching aggregate choice frequencies in each alternative. We initialized the η Σ covariance matrix by setting all off-diagonal elements to zero, and each diagonal element to 5X10 8 . We used large initial variances because doing so increases the size of the initial Gibbs steps, and seems to improve the rate of convergence of the algorithm. first column labels the parameter, and the second contains its data generating value. The performance of the algorithm is quite impressive. In almost all cases, the posterior means of the wage function parameters deviate only slightly from the true values in percentage terms. Also, the posterior standard deviations are in most cases quite small, suggesting that the data contain a great deal of information about these structural parameters -even without imposing the assumption that agents form the future component "optimally." Finally, despite the fact that the posterior standard deviations are quite small, the posterior means are rarely more than two posterior deviations away from the true values.
7 As with the polynomial data, the standard deviation of the nonpecuniary component seems difficult to pin down. Unlike the polynomial data, the school payoff parameters are not pinned down as well as the wage equation parameters. This is perhaps not surprising since school payoffs are never observed. The results of Table 5 indicate that in a case where agents form the future component optimally, we can still obtain reliable and precise inferences about structural parameters of the current payoff functions using a simplified and misspecified model that says the future component is a simple fourth-order polynomial in the state variables. But we are also interested in how well our method approximates the decision rule used by the agents. In Table 6 we consider an experiment in which we use the posterior means for the parameters π that characterize how agents form expectations to form an estimate of agents' decision rules. We then simulate five new artificial data sets, using the exact same draws for the current period payoffs as were used to generate the original five artificial data sets. The only difference is that the estimated future component is substituted for the true future component in forming the decision rule. The results in Table 6 indicate that the mean wealth losses from using the estimated decision rule range from five-hundredths to three-tenths of one percent. The percentage of choices that agree between agents who use the optimal versus the approximate rules ranges from 89.8% to 93.5%. These results suggest that our estimated polynomial approximations to the optimal decision rules are reasonably accurate. Consequently, each data point in latter periods contains relatively less information about the future component's value. Overall, however, these figures furnish additional evidence that the polynomial approximation does a reasonable job of capturing the key characteristics of the true future component.
Conclusion
This chapter described how to implement a simulation based method for inference that is applicable to a wide class of dynamic multinomial choice models. The results of a Monte Carlo analysis demonstrated that the method works very well in relatively large state-space models with only partially-observed payoffs where very high dimensional integrations are required. Although our discussion focused on models with discrete choices and independent and identically distributed stochastic terms, the method can also be applied to models with mixed continuous/discrete choice sets and serially correlated shocks (see Houser, (1999)).
Appendix A. The future component
The future component we used was a fourth-order polynomial in the state variables. Below, in the interest of space and clarity, we will develop that polynomial only up to its third order terms. The extension to the higher order terms is obvious. From equation (2.6), the future component is the flexible functional form
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Here, we have subsumed α and Λ into π and , Ψ respectively (as we did in step 5 of section 3) and defined
where
We have also defined
Where ( )
2), and 0 .
Since the only arguments common to both g and h are those that include functions of wages, we can express (B1) as , , ) .
We first observe that for any configuration of unobserved wages in ,
To see this, note that we can express
Σ is proportional to a normal-Wishart density (Bernardo and Smith, (1994) 
where π and ( ) S π are defined in a way that is exactly analogous to (B8).
for any configuration of unobserved wages in Ω and latent utilities in . ∆ It follows that ( , ) h Z W is bounded over . Ω × ∆ Thus, the integral (B1) reduces to
which is finite since each element of the integrand is bounded over the compact domain of integration. // 
